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The Allocation of the Burden of Proof in
Marine Fire Damage Cases
When cargo is damaged or destroyed in a fire at sea, the owner
of the cargo (the shipper) must overcome two statutory exemption
provisions in order to recover damages from the owner of the ves-
sel (the carrier). The Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act' (the
"Limitation Act") and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act2
("COGSA"), respectively, exempt carriers from liability for fire
damage unless the fire was caused by the carrier's "design or neg-
lect ' 3 or "actual fault or privity."4 Not only must there be a negli-
gent cause for the fire, but the negligence must be connected to the
carrier5 before the shipper can recover. Although it is generally ac-
1 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1976).
2 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976).
3 Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976) (Loss by fire):
No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make good to any person
any loss or damage, which may happen to any merchandise whatsoever, which shall be
shipped, taken in, or put on board any such vessel, by reason or by means of any fire
happening to or on board the vessel, unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect
of such owner.
This exemption in the so-called "fire statute" extends only to the carrier. In maritime com-
merce, however, carriers often lease their vessels through a "charter-party" arrangement.
Most charter-parties are for a specified time or a particular voyage; the carrier retains re-
sponsibility for selecting and supervising the crew and maintaining the vessel. These "time"
or "voyage" lessees, or charterers, are not exempted from liability for fire damage by 46
U.S.C. § 182. If the charterer takes on full responsibility for the vessel, the so-called
"bareboat" charter (relatively rare in modern commerce), then the charterer is entitled to
the exemption of the fire statute by id. § 186. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 193-94 (2d ed. 1975).
4 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4, 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976) (uncontrollable causes of
loss) ("(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from . . . (b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.").
COGSA applies to any bill of lading (contract of carriage) involving any vessel engaged
in foreign trade carrying cargo by sea to or from ports of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §
1300. Bills of lading arising out of the carriage of goods between United States ports may
make COGSA applicable by express statement. 46 U.S.C. § 1312. COGSA only applies from
"tackle to tackle," i.e., after loading and before the discharge of the goods. 46 U.S.C. §
1301(e). COGSA applies both to the owner of the vessel and to the charterer, regardless of
the type of charter-party, cf. supra note 3; both are included in COGSA's definition of "car-
rier." 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a). The fire statute was saved from repeal or modification. 46 U.S.C.
§ 1308.
5 This phrase means the carrier must be involved personally in the "actual fault or
privity" and "design or neglect." Without proof of this connection, the carrier will be exon-
erated from liability for fire damage. See Alfa Romeo, Inc. v. S.S. Torinita, 499 F. Supp.
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cepted that the shipper must prove the fire was caused by negli-
gence,6 there is considerable disagreement over which party should
bear the burden of proving whether the negligence was connected
to the carrier.7 Because catastrophic events at sea can cause the
loss of most evidence of causation, burden of proof rules can have
litigation determinative effects in admiralty cases.8 Burden of
proof rules can also affect insurance and freight rates9 and ship-
pers' choices of carriers. 10
This comment addresses the allocation of the burden of proof
in fire damage cases. After reviewing the historical development of
shipowners' liability, the comment analyzes the interrelations of
the various statutes that may be involved in fire damage litigation.
Although the statutes offer little guidance for choosing a burden
allocation rule, the alternatives available have strikingly different
consequences for the internal coherence of the statutory scheme.
The comment concludes that requiring the carrier to prove the ab-
sence of personal connection to the negligent cause of a fire better
integrates the statutes defining the carrier's obligations to the
shipper without diminishing the effect of the carrier's exemptions
from liability for fire damage to cargo.
I. GENERAL MARITIME LAW AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF
SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY
A. General Maritime Law Liability
Under general maritime law, the carrier insured the goods on
1272, 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afi'd mer., 659 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1981); Hanson & Orth, Inc. v.
M/V Jalatarang, 450 F. Supp. 528, 540 (S.D. Ga. 1978); In re G.b.R.M.S. Caldas, 350 F.
Supp. 566, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem., 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1973).
6 See, e.g., In re Ta Chi Nay. (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1982); In re
G.b.R.M.S. Caldas, 350 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd mem., 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir.
1973).
Compare Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre,
480 F.2d 669, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1973) (burden on shipper to show carrier's negligence) and
Keene v. The Whistler, 14 F. Cas. 208, 208 (D. Cal. 1873) (No. 7645) (shipper must prove
fire was caused by carrier's negligence) with Hasbro Indus. v. M.S. St. Constantine, 1980
Am. Mar. Cas. 1425, 1442 (D. Hawaii 1980) (carrier must prove it acted "without actual
fault, privity, or neglect"), affd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983) and In re
G.b.R.M.S. Caldas, 350 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (burden on carrier to show no
design or neglect), afl'd mem., 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1973).
8 See In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 98, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
982 (1972); Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores,
S.A., 388 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); States S.S. Co. v. United
States, 259 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1957); The Cleveco, 154 F.2d 605, 614 (6th Cir. 1946).
' See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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its vessel.11 The carrier was held to a very high standard of
prevoyage preparedness; a near absolute warranty of the vessel's
seaworthiness12 was required.13 The carrier could escape liability
for damaged cargo only if the damage was caused by an act of God,
an act of a public enemy, the inherent vice of the cargo, or the
fault of the shipper.14 Even if the damage was caused by one of
these excepted perils, the carrier was still liable for his own negli-
gence, the negligence of the master and crew of the vessel, and that
of his other servants.1 5 There was no requirement that the negli-
gence be personal to the carrier; virtually any negligence that
caused cargo damage was imputed to the carrier, no matter who
was responsible.
Although the liability rules under general maritime law were
very different from those in force today, the allocation of the bur-
dens of proof was substantially similar. The shipper first had to
prove a prima facie case: that the cargo had been delivered to the
carrier in good condition at the point of origin of the voyage, and'
that the carrier had failed to deliver the cargo in good condition at
its destination. 8 To escape liability, the carrier then had to prove
the existence of an excepted peril.' To overcome this defense, the
" See New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 381
(1848); see also Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249,
254 (1943); T. CARVER, 1 CARRIAGE BY SEA 3-4 (11th ed. 1963).
12 Seaworthiness is a fundamental concept in maritime law. It forms the underpinnings
of the carrier's duties under both general maritime law and later statutory enactments. See
infra notes 34, 92. A precise definition of seaworthiness is not possible since it is a relative
concept:
The requirement is that the vessel not only be staunch and strong, but also that she be
fitted out with all proper equipment in good order, and with a sufficient and competent
crew and complement of officers. But these requirements are relative to the voyage or
service proposed. A ship that is in one or another of these respects unseaworthy for an
Atlantic crossing in December may nevertheless be seaworthy for a coasting run to the
South in the same season.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 65 (footnotes omitted). See also The Sagamore,
300 F. 701, 703 (2d Cir. 1924).
13 See Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 23 (1859); see also Chamlee,
The Absolute Warranty of Seaworthiness: A History and Comparative Study, 24 MERCER
L. REv. 519 (1974).
14 See G. GiLMoRz & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 139-40; A. KNAUTH, THE AammcAN LAW
OF OCEAN BILLs OF LADNnG 116 (4th ed. 1953).
25 T. CARVER, supra note 11, at 18-19.
16 See Transportation Co. v. Downer, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 129, 133 (1870) (in nonstatu-
tory action, shipper established prima facie case by showing delivery in good condition and
receipt of damaged cargo); Lawrence v. Minturn, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 100, 107 (1854) (in non-
statutory action, shipper established prima facie case by proof of delivery of goods at begin-
Ding of voyage, nonreceipt at their destination).
17 See Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 28 (1859) (in nonstatutory
action, it was incumbent upon carrier to prove an excepted peril once cargo damage was
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shipper had to prove that the carrier had acted negligently or that
negligence could be imputed to the carrier.18
B. Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act
Common law nations were the last to allow carriers to aban-
don all proprietary interest in a vessel and thereby limit liability
for cargo damage. 19 In 1848 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the gen-
eral maritime law principle that a carrier was the insurer of the
cargo's safe delivery.20 This holding prompted Congress to enact
the first national legislation limiting carrier liability,2 the Limita-
tion of Shipowners' Liability Act,22 in 1851. The Limitation Act
reduced the carrier's responsibility for cargo damage that occurred
after the vessel had left the carrier's effective control.2 3 If the dam-
age occurred "without the privity or knowledge" of the carrier, the
carrier's liability was limited to the value of the vessel and the
freight then pending.24
A separate exemption within the Limitation Act, known as the
fire statute,25 exonerated the carrier from all liability for cargo
shown); Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 272, 280 (1851) (carrier must show damage was
caused by excepted peril or express exception in bill of lading).
' See Transportation Co. v. Downer, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 129, 133-35 (1870) (in nonstat-
utory action, it was reversible error for lower court to instruct jury that carrier had burden
of showing absence of negligence); The Delhi, 7 F. Cas. 413, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 3770)
(in nonstatutory action, shipper must prove carrier negligence).
" See The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 380 (D. Me. 1831) (No. 11,619). Judge Ware's opin-
ion in The Rebecca, in particular the discussion of the history of the limitation of liability,
was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
104, 116 (1871). Two states, Massachusetts and Maine, passed limitation acts early in the
nineteenth century. See Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipown-
ers' Liability, 53 TUL. L. Rav. 999, 1009 (1979).
20 New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 379-80 (1848).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 33, 31st Cong., 1st Seass. 1 (1850).
22 Ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1976)).
'3 See Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U.S. 638, 646-47 (1891).
' Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 3, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976).
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any
embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchan-
dise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by colli-
sion, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or
incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall
not ... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and
her freight then pending.
Id. "Freight then pending" has been held to mean the proceeds received by or due the
carrier for that particular voyage. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 131-32 (1894).
2" Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976), quoted
supra note 3.
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damage caused by fire.2 6 The separate exemption for fire was based
on English law, 7 but no substantive rationale for the separation is
apparent from the legislative history. It may have been due to the
extraordinary danger fire at sea has always posed to vessels.28
Allocation of the burden of proof under the fire statute was
only alluded to in congressional debate on the Limitation Act. The
comments suggest that Congress thought the burden of proving en-
titlement to the exemption would be on the carrier.29 The first dis-
trict court to deal with the question, however, held that the burden
was on the shipper "to show that [the] fire was caused by the de-
sign or neglect of the [carrier],"30 and the vast majority of courts
since have followed that first decision. 1
26 See Walker v. Transportation Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150, 153 (1865).
7 The English statute in force in 1851 provided the carrier unconditional exoneration
from liability for fire. 26 Geo. 3, ch. 86, § 2 (1786). For the history of the early statutory
development and the English influence on American law, see Donovan, supra note 19.
28 "From earliest times fire has been one of the most terrifying perils of the sea which
perhaps explains why a special exception has been made for it." W. TETLEY, MAIuNE CARGO
CLAIMS 183 (2d ed. 1978). See also In re Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d 1249, 1250 (9th
Cir. 1975).
29 Comments during Senate debate suggest that the carrier should not only prove that
the damage was caused by fire, but also, as an initial matter, that the fire was not caused by
carrier negligence. While discussing the effect that § 1 of the Act, the fire statute, might
have on parties' contracts, Senator Phelps of Vermont stated:
The exemption from responsibility should not be on account of certain actions, but the
principle recognized by the bill should be this: that the utmost faithfulness and vigi-
lance should be exacted from the carrier, and in case of loss he should be able to ex-
empt himself from responsibility only by clearing himself of all culpability.
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 719 (1851).
The concern expressed by Senator Phelps and others about the effect of the Limitation
Act on parties' contracts was addressed by an amendment in the form of a proviso to § 1:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall prevent the parties from making such
contracts as they please, extending or limiting the liabilities of ship-owners." Id. at 720. The
proviso appeared in the statute as originally enacted, see Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, § 1, 9
Stat. 635, 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976)), but for no apparent reason was
deleted in the 1874 revision, see U.S. REv. STAT. § 4282 (1875). Cf. Walker v. Transporta-
tion Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150, 153-55 (1865) (for the stipulation in the contract to overcome
a fire statute defense, the contract clause must be express).
30 Keene v. The Whistler, 14 F. Cas. 208, 208 (D. Cal. 1873) (No. 7645). Before Keene,
the fire statute had been construed in only two reported cases, Walker v. Transportation
Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150 (1865), and Dill v. The Bertram, 7 F. Cas. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1857)
(No. 3910).
The Supreme Court may have indicated a view contrary to the Keene rule through
dictum in a case arising under the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 3, 46 U.S.C. §
183 (1976). In Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 602 (1883), speaking
of owners, the Court observed: "They may not be able, under the first section [46 U.S.C.
§ 182], to show that it happened without any neglect on their part ... whilst they may be
very confident of showing, under the third section [46 U.S.C. § 183], that it happened with-
out their privity or knowledge."
31 The great majority of cases have followed the Keene allocation. E.g., J. Howard
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Tension between shippers and carriers was not resolved by the
passage of the Limitation Act. During the latter half of the nine-
teenth century both groups were dissatisfied with their legal rela-
tions under applicable law.3 2 Congress attempted to clarify the sit-
uation by passing the Harter Act" in 1893. The general principle
underlying the Act was that if the carrier exercised due diligence
to provide a seaworthy vessel, the carrier would be exempted from
liability for damage arising from certain enumerated causes.34 The
Smith, Inc. v. S.S. Maranon, 501 F.2d 1275, 1277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975 (1974);
Automobile Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 224 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885
(1955); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 205 F.2d 886, 887 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953); American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera,
194 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952); Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver
Line Ltd., 143 F.2d 462, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 767 (1944); The Older, 65 F.2d
359, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1933); The Salvore, 60 F.2d 683, 685 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 653 (1932); Hanson & Orth, Inc. v. M/V Jalatarang, 450 F. Supp. 528, 538 (S.D. Ga.
1978); The Sandgate Castle, 30 F. Supp. 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); The Cabo Hatteras, 5 F.
Supp. 725, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). The first time the Keene rule was challenged was in
Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 269 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.), modified, 273 F.2d 61, 63
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934 (1960); see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
:2 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 142-43.
3 Ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1976)). The
modern ambit of the statute is limited, although it still applies to the period of time before
loading and after unloading the cargo, Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 12, 46 U.S.C. § 1311
(1976). The Harter Act also applies to domestic bills of lading and to on-deck cargo. See
Blanchard Lumber Co. v. S.S. Anthony II, 259 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" The central concept of the Harter Act is contained in 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1976):
If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in
the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all
respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel,
her owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held responsible for dam-
age or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said
vessel nor shall [they] be held liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea or other
navigable waters, acts of God, or public enemies, or the inherent defect, quality, or vice
of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of package, or seizure under legal process, or
for loss resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his
agent or representative, or from saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, or
from any deviation in rendering such service.
See also The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 8 (1903) ("The effect of this law is not to relieve the
owner from the general duty of furnishing a seaworthy ship, but to limit his liability in
certain particulars ... ."). This provision has been characterized as a compromise between
shipper and carrier interests. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 142-43. The
absolute warranty of seaworthiness imposed by the general maritime law, see supra note 12,
was reduced to a duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. See G. Gm-
MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 151. The measure of due diligence, however, is broad.
See International Nav. Co. v. Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co., 181 U.S. 218, 225 (1901) ("the dili-
gence required is diligence to make the ship in all respects seaworthy, and that . . . means
due diligence on the part of all the owners' servants in the use of the [ship's] equipment
before the commencement of the voyage" (emphasis in original)). See also The Wildcroft,
201 U.S. 378, 387 (1906); Erie & St. Lawrence Corp. v. Barnes-Ames Co., 52 F.2d 217, 218-19
(W.D.N.Y. 1931); Villareal, The Concept of Due Diligence in Maritime Law, 2 J. MAR. L. &
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Harter Act did not, however, address damage caused by fire. 5 Al-
though the Harter Act was an innovative congressional response to
problems in shipper-carrier relations, the Act did not relieve the
pressure for greater legal clarification of responsibilities in mari-
time cargo law.3 6
C. The Hague Rules and COGSA
Uncertainty and inconsistency among nations regarding the
duties of shippers and carriers led to a series of international mari-
time law conferences in the 1890's and the early part of this cen-
tury 7 that resulted in the Hague Rules.38 The rules are essentially
based on the Harter Act principle.3 9 The Hague Rules, however,
specifically include a fire liability exemption. 0 There does not ap-
pear-to have been any discussion of the allocation of the burden of
proof under the fire exemption at the conferences drafting the
Hague Rules.41 Although the United States signed the Hague Con-
vention in 192542 ratification of the Convention was not officially
proclaimed until 1937;43 the rules were enacted as domestic legisla-
COM. 763, 764 (1971).
46 U.S.C. § 196 (1976) expressly saves the fire statute from modification or repeal.
" See A. KNAUTH, supra note 14, at 122-24.
" See generally id. at 124-27.
" International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading, opened for signature Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155
(U.S. ratification proclaimed Nov. 6, 1937); see generally A. KNAUTH, supra note 14, at 126-
31.
" G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 143.
40 As originally drafted at the fifth session of the Hague conference the proposed fire
exemption read: "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage
arising or resulting from ... [fmire." REPORT OF THE DELEGATES OF THE U.S. TO THE INTER-
NATONAL CONFERENCE ON MARImME LAW, FIFTH SESSION 15 (1923) [hereinafter cited as 1923
REPORT]. This would have resulted in carrier exoneration under all circumstances involving
fire. The United States moved to add to art. IV(2)(b), the fire provision, the words "unless
caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier." This change was unanimously agreed to
and adopted in the final version of the rules. Id. at 26. The source of the terms "actual fault
or privity" probably was the English fire statute, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58
Vict., ch. 60, § 502. See Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading: Hearings on S. 1152 Before the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1936) (memo-
randum of J.M. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as 1936
House Hearings]; Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearing on S. 1152 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935) (memorandum of J.C. Peacock, director, U.S.
Shipping Board Bureau) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing].
41 See 1923 REPORT, supra note 40, at 23-29 (mentioning discussion of most proposed
rule changes but not of fire exemption change).
" The convention was signed by the U.S. Ambassador at Brussels on June 23, 1925. 79
CONG. REc. 4754 (1935).
41 See supra note 38.
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tion in 1936 in COGSA. 4 4
The only burden of proof issue discussed by Congress in en-
acting COGSA related to section 4(2)(q)." The section was drafted
in response to a specific, and serious, problem. Beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century, carriers regularly inserted numerous non-
statutory liability exception clauses in bills of lading.4" Courts nor-
mally upheld the validity of these exceptions 47 and, applying the
traditional burden of proof allocations,48 required the shipper to
prove that the damage was caused by carrier negligence whenever
an exception was shown. As the number and scope of these con-
tractual exceptions grew, it became nearly impossible for shippers
to recover damages from carriers, since shippers typically did not
have access to evidence that would demonstrate carrier negligence.
The burden allocation thus determined the outcome of many cargo
44 Pub. L. No. 74-521, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976)).
COGSA has been called a congressional reaction to a Supreme Court decision considered
adverse to carrier interests, May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A.G., 290 U.S. 333
(1933) (The Isis) (no exoneration under the Harter Act for shipowner who negligently fails
to provide a seaworthy vessel, even if unseaworthiness was not related to the excepted cause
of damage). See A. KNAUTH, supra note 14, at 129. See also 1936 House Hearings, supra
note 40, at 11-12; Senate Hearing, supra note 40, at 19 ("This construction results in the
imposition upon carriers of a liability which is more onerous than that imposed by the law
of any other country.").
45 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(q) (1976). See, e.g., 1936 House Hearings, supra note 40, at 44-
46, 68; Senate Hearing, supra note 40, at 33, 37, 47; H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, 6, 9 (1936); 79 CONG. Rzc. 13,341 (1935).
The fire exemption was not a central concern in the hearings, perhaps because of the
perception that COGSA would work no fundamental change from the fire statute. See,
e.g., 1936 House Hearings, supra note 40, at 63 (memorandum of American Steamship
Owners' Association) ("[t]he bill will confer no advantage on the shipowner as respects
losses by fire"). Further, although the enactment of the Hague Convention had been consid-
ered previously by Congress, there was virtually no discussion of the fire exemption in the
earlier congressional considerations of the Convention. See generally Relating to the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea: Hearings on H.R. 3830 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 71st Cong., 2d Seass. (1930); Relating to the Carriage of Goods by
Sea: Hearings on H.R. 11447 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, 68th Cong., 2d Seas. (1925); Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings on
H.R. 14166 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 67th Cong.,
4th Sess. (1923); H.R. Rap. No. 1620, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925).
46 See G. GUmoR & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 141-42; see also Caterpillar Overseas,
S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963); Com-
ment, Cargo Damage at Sea: The Ship's Liability, 27 Tzx. L. Rav. 525, 528 (1949).
47 See Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 272, 280 (1851). United States courts, how-
ever, held that a contractual liability exception could not exempt the carrier from liability
for the negligence of his servants. See, e.g., Compania de Navigacion La Flecha v. Braver,
168 U.S. 104, 118-19 (1897); The Willdomino, 300 F. 5, 9 (3d Cir. 1924), af'd sub nom. S.S.
Willdomino v. Citro Chem. Co., 272 U.S. 718 (1927). British courts had taken the opposite
position. See In re Missouri S.S. Co., 42 Ch. D. 321, 329 (1889).
48 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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damage suits."'
COGSA dealt with this problem in three ways. First, there are
sixteen exemptions from carrier liability specifically listed in sec-
tion 4(2)(a)-(p).50 Section 4(2)(q) then sets out a general liability
exemption for "[a]ny other cause arising without the actual fault
and privity of the carrier and without the fault or neglect of the
agents or servants of the carrier." '51 This was intended to eliminate
the need for contractual exception clauses.52 Second, section
4(2)(q) provided that for any exemption not enumerated in section
4(2)(a)-(p), the burden of proof would fall on the carrier, rather
than on the shipper, to show that the damage was not caused by
carrier negligence.53 Finally, COGSA declared all contractual ex-
ception clauses that negated or lessened the statutory protections
to be "null and void and of no effect." 4
II. THE CURRENT STATUTORY CONTEXT FOR FiRE DAMAGE CASES
The trial of a fire damage action is complicated by the uncer-.
tain interplay of the statutes set out above. The Limitation Act,55
the fire statute, 6 the Harter Act,57 and COGSA58 all are currently
4, Cf. the following report:
Serious losses by pilferage, for instance, were prevalent during and after the World
War, resulting in the refusal of underwriters to insure more than 75 percent of the risk
against pilferage. It is sufficient to say that, under a Hague Rules bill of lading, full
cover is now obtainable, inasmuch as the carrier, under the rules, is required to prove
that the pilferage was not caused by his agents or servants, or through their negligence.
1936 House Hearings, supra note 40, at 46 (document prepared by Bank of America); see
also id. at 26, 42, 61, 75-76; Senate Hearing, supra note 40, at 45, 48-49; Note, The Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act, 23 VA. L. Ray. 590, 595 (1937).
50 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a)-(p) (1976). This list includes the fire exemption at §
1304(2)(b).
51 Id. § 1304(2)(q).
52 H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1936). See also 1936 House Hearings,
supra note 40, at 41, 100; Senate Hearing, supra note 40, at 44, 48, 73.
"[T]he burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception
to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the
agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage." Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act § 4(2)(q), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(q) (1976). See also sources cited supra note 52.
46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1976):
(8) Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or
the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising
from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section,
or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and
void and of no effect.
-1 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1976). See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
56 Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976). See supra notes
25-28 and accompanying text.
57 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1976). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976). See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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in force.5 9 An equal, or greater, source of difficulty are the unde-
fined interrelations between significant provisions within COGSA,
in particular those between the fire exemption 0 and the carrier's
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel," and between the fire exemp-
tion and the specific burden allocation of section 4(2)(q).2 Judicial
construction of the various statutes as they bear on the burden al-
location in fire damage cases is sparse. This part examines these
different statutes, as construed by the courts, looking in particular
at their implications for allocation of the burden of proof in fire
damage cases.
A. COGSA Fire Exemption and the Fire Statute
The fire statute in the 1851 Limitation Act, which was explic-
itly saved from repeal by the Harter Act6 and by COGSA," re-
lieves the carrier of liability for cargo damage due to fire "unless
such fire is caused by the design or neglect of such [carrier]." 65
COGSA, however, contains a fire exemption of its own that relieves
the carrier of liability for cargo damage due to fire "unless caused
by the actual fault or privity of the carrier."66 There was some con-
cern expressed in the congressional hearings on COGSA that the
fire statute and the COGSA exemption might be interpreted differ-
ently by the courts because of the different language. In the end, it
was decided that the terms were substantially equivalent; the lan-
59 Although no change in this statutory scheme appears imminent, the United Nations
and other international organizations have been working in recent years to modify the legal
relations between carriers and shippers. See Basnayake, Introduction: Origins of the 1978
Hamburg Rules, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 353 (1979). A 1978 United Nations Convention, known
as the Hamburg Rules, United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, March
31, 1978, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 89, reprinted in M. COHEN, A. SANN, B. CHAsE, N. GOLDEN &
J. GRIEDER, 6 BENEDICT ON AnmLntTy 1-32.2. (7th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 6 BENE-
DICT], significantly expands the scope of carrier liability. See 6 BENEDICT, supra, at 1-35;
Hellawell, Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 357,
362-63 (1979); Note, The Hamburg Rules Fault Concept and Common Carrier Liability
Under U.S. Law, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 444-46 (1979). Although the United States was a
signatory to the Convention, prospects for its enactment as domestic legislation are dim.
See Moore, The Hamburg Rules, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 11 (1978); Comment, Risk of Loss
in Shipping Under the Hamburg Rules, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 568, 575 (1981).
:0 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
*1 Id. § 3(1), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1) (1976).
42 Id. § 4(2)(q), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(q) (1976). See supra notes 45-53 and accompany-
ing text.
'3 See supra note 35.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 8, 46 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976).
6 Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976).
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
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guage of the Hague Rules was retained in COGSA in the interest
of international uniformity.6 7 Courts have treated the exemptions
as identical.6 8 The allocation of the burden of proof articulated
under the fire statute over a century ago-shipper must show the
fire was caused by carrier design or neglect to overcome the exemp-
tion69-has enjoyed continued, largely unquestioned, popularity
under COGSA.
B. Section 3 of the Limitation Act
Section 3 of the Limitation Act limits the carrier's liability to
the value of the ship for loss or damage caused other than by fire,
so long as the loss or damage occurred "without the privity or
knowledge" of the carrier.70 The Supreme Court has placed the
burden on the carrier to prove the loss occurred without his "priv-
ity or knowledge" in order to qualify for this limitation.7 1
It was once suggested that the standard of "privity or knowl-
edge" differed from the fire statute's requirement that the loss not
be due to the carrier's "design or neglect. '72 More recent cases
have treated the two standards as essentially equivalent; denial of
exemption under the fire statute would require denial of limitation
under section 3.78 It is not uncommon for the same case to involve
both statutes, 7  and it might therefore seem sensible to have the
same burden of proof allocation for the two equivalent provi-
sions.7 5 It also appears fair superficially to require the carrier to
11 See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 40, at 13, 141; Senate Hearing, supra note 40,
at 60.
" See, e.g., In re Ta Chi Nay. (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 228 (2d Cir. 1982); In re
Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 1975).
6 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
70 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). See generally supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
71 Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1943).
71 See Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 602 (1883); Hines v.
Butler, 278 F. 877, 880 (4th Cir. 1921). See also G. G.moRE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at
879.
", See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947); In re G.b.R.M.S. Caldas, 350 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Pa.
1972), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1973); see also G. GiLmoRE & C. BLACK, supra note
3, at 879.
74 See, e.g., In re Ta Chi Nay. (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 226 (2d Cir.. 1982) (deal-
ing with "petition of shipowner for exoneration from or limitation of liability for cargo dam-
age claims resulting from a shipboard explosion and fire"); China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A.O.
Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1966) (involving both a collision and a fire).
" The notion of symmetry in the law formed the basis for Gilmore & Black's position:
There is no reason why the allocation of the burden of proof should be different in
Fire Statute cases from the universally accepted allocation in Limitation Act
cases .... It may be that the use of the term "neglect" in the Fire Statute led to
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make at least as great a showing to obtain exoneration under the
fire statute as to obtain the lesser benefit of the limitation section.
Nevertheless, only one case has found the burden allocation under
the fire statute to match the allocation for section 3 of the Limita-
tion Act,76 and then only in dicta, based on questionable author-
ity.77 Most of the decided cases are to the contrary, although none
has analyzed the apparent conflict with section 3.78
C. COGSA Section 4(2)(q)
COGSA section 4(2)(a)-(p) exempts carriers from liability for
loss or damage arising from sixteen causes.7 1 COGSA section
4(2)(q) also exempts carriers from liability for loss or damage aris-
ing from "any other cause arising without the actual fault or priv-
ity of the carrier."80 The statute says nothing about the burden of
proof for the exemptions listed in section 4(2)(a)-(p); it does, how-
ever, specify that the burden is on the carrier to prove there is no
"actual fault or privity" to obtain the benefit of section 4(2)(q).8 1
At least one court has read the explicit burden allocation in section
4(2)(q) as implying the opposite allocation for the exemptions in
judicial confusion: just as the plaintiff in a tort case bears the burden of proving the
defendant's "negligence," so (it may have seemed to follow) the claimant in a Fire Stat-
ute case must bear the burden of proving the owner's "neglect."
... [T]he cases to the contrary notwithstanding, the burden of proof rule in the
Fire Statute cases should be the same as in the Limitation Act cases: burden on the
claimant to show negligence or fault; burden on the owner to show that the fire was not
"caused by [his] design or neglect."
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 896.
7'6 In re G.b.R.M.S. Caldas, 350 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d
678, 680 (3d Cir. 1973).
7 Id. The court first cited Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1943), which is dis-
tinguishable on the law, since Coryell was decided under 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976), and on the
facts, since Coryell did not involve a shipper-carrier dispute over fire damage. The court
also relied on Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 269 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1959). The
opinion is of dubious precedential value. The court, per Clark, C.J., had stated: "Once negli-
gence has been shown the burden of proof of coming within the exemption from liability of
the Fire Statute . . .is on the owner." Id. at 71. Six weeks later, the carrier's petition for
rehearing was granted. Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 273 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934 (1960). The cause was remanded for a specific finding as to
whether the owner was personally negligent, including whether the negligent actions of his
agents could be imputed to him. Judge Moore's opinion (over a dissent by Chief Judge
Clark) is, at best, an ambiguous repudiation of the earlier holding. Id. at 63.
78 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
79 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a)-(p) (1976). This list includes the fire exemption, id. §
1304(2)(b).
:0 Id. § 1304(2)(q).
I Id.
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section 4(2)(a)-(p).82
However appealing this reading may be at first glance, there is
no support for it in the legislative history of this section, nor does
it hold up on closer examination of the specific exemptions in sec-
tion 4(2)(a)-(p). The burden allocation in section 4(2)(q) was calcu-
lated to remedy a specific harm, namely, the abuse of nonstatutory
exception clauses in bills of lading;83 it was not designed to create a
backward looking burden of proof rule that would inform the rest
of the statute.
The exemptions specifically listed in section 4(2) are indepen-
dent of one another and of section 4(2)(q); they are not logically
interconnected, nor are they of a homogeneous quality. The ex-
emptions are derived from general maritime law,84 the Limitation
Act, 5 and the Harter Act;88 some were entirely new to American
law. 7 The courts that have applied these exemptions in cargo
damage cases have not allocated the burdens of proof uniformly
for all exemptions, but have fit the allocation to the purposes and
characteristics of each exception. 8 There appears to be no basis
82 To hold that when a carrier has shown that the loss arose as a consequence of re-
straint of princes, § 4(2)(g), it still has the burden of negating any other fault or neg-
lect of its agents or servants would be to read the qualification of (q) into (a)-(p), al-
though Congress did not put it there.
Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426, 432 (2d Cir. 1962). Cf. In re Ta Chi Nay.
(Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1982) (court will not depart from prior precedent
and place burden on carrier except where directed by statute).
82 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. These include the exemptions for
damage caused by an act of God, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(d) (1976), an act of public enemies, id.
§ 1304(2)(f), the fault of the shipper, id. § 1304(2)(i), and an inherent defect in the cargo, id.
§ 1304(2)(m).
85 For example, the fire exemption, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976); cf. id. § 182 (the fire
statute).
"See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. These include the exemptions for
damage by the fault of the master and crew of the ship, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976), perils
of the sea, id. § 1304(2)(c), seizure at law, id. § 1304(2)(g), attempts to save life or property,
id. § 1304(2)(1), and insufficient packing, id. § 1304(2)(n).
87 These include the exemptions for act of war, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(e) (1976), restraint
of princes, id. § 1304 (2)(g), quarantine restrictions, id. § 1304(2)(h), strikes or lockouts, id.
§ 1304(2)(j), riots or commotions, id. § 1304(2)(k), insufficient marks, id. § 1304(2)(o), and
latent defects, id. § 1304(2)(p).
" See, e.g., J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine Howaldt, 437 F.2d 580, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1971)
(the burden of proof rules are altered under "perils of the seas" exception; ship has to estab-
lish freedom from negligence); Horn v. Cia de Navegacion Fruco, SA., 404 F.2d 422, 435
(5th Cir. 1968) (carrier must show "inherent vice" of goods to receive statutory exculpation),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); The Daido Line v. Thomas P. Gonzalez, Corp., 299 F.2d
669, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1962) (in cases involving allegations of "inherent vice," burden of proof
allocation is especially difficult; "clean" bill of lading is not enough to support shipper's
prima facie case); American Tobacco Co. v. Goulandris, 281 F.2d 179, 181 (2d Cir. 1960) (the
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beyond legislative silence for determining the fire exemption bur-
dens of proof according to the allocation in section 4(2)(q).
D. The Carrier's Duty to Provide a Seaworthy Vessel
The carrier's duty under COGSA to provide a seaworthy ves-
sel"9 presents further complications regarding the burden of proof
in fire damage cases. In every case where a shipper has recovered
for fire damage to cargo, the court has found a prevoyage defect in
the vessel that amounted to unseaworthiness.90 COGSA makes an
explicit allocation of the burden of proof for seaworthiness, but not
for the fire exemption.
COGSA adopts the general principle underlying the Harter
Act 1 that the carrier is exempt from liability for cargo damage re-
sulting from unseaworthiness only if the carrier exercised "due dil-
igence" to provide a seaworthy vessel at the beginning of the voy-
age.92 The burden of proving the exercise of due diligence is placed
burden of showing freedom from "inherent vice" is on the shipper not the carrier); see also
G. GnLMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 159-73.
" See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
" See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1979) (inadequate crew training, defective machinery), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980); In
re Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975) (improper training of crew and
equipment deficiencies); Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien
Fabre, 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973) (inadequate arrangement of fire fighting equipment);
China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A.O. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1966) (unrepaired
machinery, inadequate crew training), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 933 (1967); Verbeeck v. Black
Diamond S.S. Corp., 269 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), modified, 273 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1959) (negligent
stowage of dangerous cargo), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934 (1960); Isbrantsen Co. v. United
States, 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) (improper stowage of dangerous cargo); Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661 (2d Cir.) (lack of dispatch in bringing hazardous situa-
tion under control), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947); United States v. Charbonnier, 45 F.2d
174 (4th Cir. 1930) (defective construction and incompetent officer); Williams S.S. Co. v.
Wilbur, 9 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1925) (improper stowage), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 666 (1926);
Hines v. Butler, 278 F. 877 (4th Cir. 1921) (improper conduct of crew), cert. denied, 257
U.S. 659 (1922); Hasbro Indus. v. M.S. St. Constantine, 1980 Am. Mar. Cas. 1425 (D. Hawaii
1980) (inadequate crew training, unrepaired machinery), afl'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d
1008 (9th Cir. 1983); Cerro Sales Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enters., 403 F. Supp. 562
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (undermanned, undertrained crew); Gesellschaft Fdr Getreidehandel .G.
v. S.S. Texas, 318 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La. 1970) (allowing ship to leave port with unexplained
smoking); The Sandgate Castle, 30 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (ship left port in a state of
disrepair); The Doris Kellogg, 18 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (ship not in proper condition
to carry dangerous cargo), aff'd mem., 94 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1938); The Elizabeth Dantzler,
263 F. 596 (E.D. Va. 1920) (improper care of dangerous cargo).
' 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1976). See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
12 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 3(1), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1) (1976):
Responsibilities and liabilities of carrier and shipSeaworthiness (1) The carrier shall be
bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to-
(a) Make the ship seaworthy;
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explicitly on the carrier.9 3 The carrier's duty to exercise due dili-
gence to provide a seaworthy vessel is not delegable; any failure to
exercise due diligence can be imputed to the carrier.2
The burden of proof for the COGSA fire exemption is not
spelled out in the statute. Cases decided under the fire statute re-
quired the carrier to prove that the damage was caused by fire, and
then required the shipper to prove that the fire was caused by the
design or neglect of the carrier. 5 Many courts have applied the
same burden allocation to the COGSA fire exemption98 since the
substantive terms of the statutes are equivalent.9 7 This allocation,
however, would. appear to be incompatible with the COGSA bur-
den allocation for seaworthiness: COGSA requires the carrier to
prove the exercise of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel,98
(b) Properly man, equip, and supply the ship;
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cooling chambers, and all other parts of the
ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage, and
preservation.
The carrier's liability for a failure of this duty is set out in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act §
4(1), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976):
Rights and immunities of carrier and shipUnseaworthiness (1) Neither the carrier nor
the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness
unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship
seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped, and supplied,
and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship
in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage, in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 1303 of this title. Whenever loss or damage
has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence
shall be on the carrier or other persons claiming exemption under this section.
The definition of "seaworthiness" and "due diligence" in COGSA are the same as under the
general maritime law, see supra note 12, and the Harter Act, see supra note 34. See Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Corp., 112 F. Supp. 630, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
("The measure of due diligence under [COGSA] involved here is no different from that
under the earlier Harter Act."); The Bill, 47 F. Supp. 969, 976 (D. Md. 1942), aff'd mem.,
145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944) (measure of due diligence same under COGSA and the Harter
Act). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 150-51; Villareal, supra note 34, at
765.
93 "Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving
the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other persons claiming exemption
under this section." Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4(1), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976).
" See Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania de Vapores, 388
F.2d 434, 438-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,-393 U.S. 828 (1968); Henson v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 68 F.2d 144, 145 (6th Cir. 1933); Cerro Sales Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enters., 403
F. Supp. 562, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); B. CHASE, M. CHYNSKY, J. LEvNs & A. SANN, 2A BENE-
DICT ON ADMIRALTY 8-4 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 2A BENEDICT]; cf. G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 152 (duty is nondelegable under British version of COGSA).
95 See Keene v. The Whistler, 14 F. Cas. 208, 208 (D. Cal. 1873) (No. 7645). See also
supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 68 and accompanying text
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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but the fire statute allocation rule requires the shipper to prove
that the damage was caused by the carrier's design or neglect,
which amounts to proving the carrier's failure to provide a seawor-
thy vessel.9 The one provision puts the burden on the carrier to
show a duty has been met, while the other would require the ship-
per to prove that virtually the same duty was neglected.
In Asbestos Corporation v. Compagnie de Navigation
Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre,00 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals noted that the traditional burden allocation for fire damage
cases was at odds with the statutory burden to show the exercise of
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.10 1 Nevertheless, the
court required the shipper to show the fire damage was caused by
the carrier's actual fault or privity. The court declared that the fire
exemption effectively overruled the statutory burden to show due
diligence.0 2 Even if it were correct to frame the question as a
choice between following the burden allocation under the seawor-
thiness section or giving effect to the fire exemption, it is not clear
that the Second Circuit made the right choice.103 There is no sup-
port in the language of COGSA or its legislative history for making
the fire exemption superior to the seaworthiness requirement.'"
The court did not consider any allocation of the burden that would
accommodate both statutory provisions in a fire damage case.
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has declared the COGSA sea-
worthiness requirement to be an "overriding obligation."' 0 5 In Has-
"See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
100 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973).
101 Id. at 672.
'0 "The burden of proof is on the carrier to show that he exercised due diligence. The
fire exemption provisions merely shift this burden of proof to the shipper. If the carrier
shows the damage was caused by fire, the shipper must prove that the carrier's negligence
caused the damage." Id. at 672-73 (footnote omitted).
103 The burden allocation the Second Circuit assumed to be an integral part of the fire
exemption may not have been a proper gloss on the statute as an original matter. What
little evidence of congressional intent exists suggests that the burden of negating design or
neglect under the fire statute should fall to the carrier. See supra note 29 and accompany-
ing text. This mistake, if it was one, was well established by the time COGSA was enacted,
however. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 45. On the face of the statute, the two provisions appear to be of
equal importance. See Carriage of Goods by Sea Act §§ 4(1), 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1304(1),
1304(2)(b) (1976).
'0 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327, 1341 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980). The apparent holding of Sunkist is that prior to
receiving any fire exemption the carrier must prove the exercise of due diligence to provide
a seaworthy vessel. Because of this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit did not specifically
address the burden of proof question under either the fire statute or the COGSA fire exemp-
tion. Id. See also Hasbro Indus. v. MUS. St. Constantine, 698 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1983).
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bro Industries v. M.S. St. Constantine,os a federal district court in
Hawaii, following the Ninth Circuit position, placed the burden on
the carrier to show the lack of "actual fault, privity, or neglect"
once it had found that the vessel was unseaworthy.10 7 The Ninth
Circuit's construction of seaworthiness has been subjected to con-
siderable criticism. 08 There is little more reason for declaring the
seaworthiness requirement superior to the fire exemption than
there is for declaring the fire exemption superior to the seaworthi-
ness requirement. What remains to be attempted is a burden allo-
cation that treats the two provisions equally.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN
OF PROOF IN FIRE DAMAGE CASES
The burden of proof allocation developed under general mari-
time law and still generally followed for fire damage cases shifts
the burden back and forth between shipper and carrier in a sort of
ping-pong game.109 Following this pattern, it appears to fall to the
shipper to prove that a fire was caused by the carrier's design or
neglect, or actual fault or privity. 10 This allocation is inconsistent
104 1980 Am. Mar. Cas. 1425 (D. Hawaii 1980), afl'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1008
(9th Cir. 1983).
107 Id. at 1442.
" For criticism of Sunkist see In re Ta Chi Nav. (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 229
(2d Cir. 1982) ("The Sunkist court would read the language of subsection (q) into subsec-
tion (b), 'although Congress did not put it there."' (quoting Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulan-
dris, 306 F.2d 426, 432 (2d Cir. 1962))); Calamari, The Eternal Conflict Between Cargo and
Hull: The Fire Statute-A Shifting Scene, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 417 (1981).
Before denying certiorari in Sunkist, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General
to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. 444 U.S. 896 (1979). The Solicitor
General's brief concluded that because of the facts in the case, the Ninth Circuit could have
based its findings on established precedents. The Solicitor General recommended that the
Court not take the case for review.
There are observations in the opinion of the court of appeals that, if taken out of
context, could serve as the basis for novel admiralty doctrine. The court suggests at
various points that the requirement of "due diligence" to make the ship seaworthy
applies to master and crew as well as the owners and is an "overriding obligation" that
must be fulfilled if the fire immunity provisions are to be invoked .... However, the
implications of these views should await further clarification in light of the narrow ba-
sis for the court's actual holding. Moreover, the present case does not appear to be an
appropriate vehicle for exploring issues of burden of proof in fire loss cases since the
underlying facts establishing fault on the part of the owner were either "undis-
puted" . . . or proven by "overwhelming evidence ....
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 8 n.4, Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd.
v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
1'" See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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with the burden allocation for nonfire damage actions under sec-
tion 3 of the Limitation Act.111 A more significant problem is that
this allocation threatens to vitiate the carrier's explicit statutory
burden to prove the exercise of due diligence to provide a seawor-
thy vessel.11 2 This part analyzes the requirement of actual fault or
privity, or design or neglect, and shows how a burden allocation of
its component parts may better resolve the tension in the statutory
scheme than does a unitary approach to the requirement.
A. Control, Connection, and Seaworthiness
The fire exemption is the only COGSA exemption that re-
quires proof not only of overriding negligence but also of a direct
connection of the negligence to the carrier. 13 For a shipper to re-
cover despite the fire exemption or the fire statute, the carrier
must be found personally negligent. " 4 Personal negligence depends
on two conditions. First, the negligence must have occurred or ex-
isted while the vessel was in the carrier's control, before and up to
the beginning of the voyage." 5 Second, the negligence must be
"' See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
"' Hanson & Orth, Inc. v. MN Jalatarang, 450 F. Supp. 528, 538 (S.D. Ga. 1978). Of
the seventeen liability exemptions in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4(2)(a)-(q), 46
U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a)-(q) (1976), the fire exemption, id. § 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b), is
the only one with a purely personal aspect. See Approaches to Basic Policy Decisions Con-
cerning Allocation of Risks Between the Cargo Owner and Carrier, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/63/
Add. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 UNCITRAL Y.B. 287, 289, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER. A/
Add. I (discussing burdens under the Hague Rules).
14 See Albina Engine & Mach. Works, Inc. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619,
622 (9th Cir. 1961); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 230 F.2d 346, 355 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956); Consumer's Import Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha (The Venice Maru), 133 F.2d 781, 784 (2d Cir.), aff'd., 320 U.S. 249
(1943); The Older, 65 F.2d 359, 359 (2d Cir. 1933); see also 2A BENEDICT, supra note 94, at
14-32. Respondeat superior doctrines do not operate to deprive the carrier of the fire exemp-
tions. Where the carrier is a corporation, the conduct of high managerial agents is consid-
ered "personal" to the carrier. See Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502, 511
(1932) (plant manager of corporation sufficiently high in corporation to create "privity or
knowledge"); Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U.S. 638, 646 (1891) (when carrier is a corpo-
ration, the "privity or knowledge" must be that of the managing officers of the corporation);
Walker v. Transportation Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150, 153 (1865) (negligence of the master
and crew cannot be imputed to the carrier); see also G. GLMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3,
at 884-88 (discussing when a corporate shipowner is chargeable with privity or knowledge so
as to defeat exemption).
5 See In re Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1975) (incompetent
crew and fire-fighting equipment); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins.
Co., 270 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1959) (fire occurred while ship was in port); Bank Line,
Ltd. v. Porter, 25 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1928) (carrier did not repair ship); Williams S.S.
Co. v. Wilbur, 9 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1925) (improper stowage), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 266
(1926); Cerro Sales Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enters., 403 F. Supp. 562, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
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such that the carrier himself or a managing agent of the carrier
should have discovered and corrected the negligent condition, that
is, the negligence must be connected, not just imputed, to the car-
rier.11 Without the presence of both carrier control and connection
in a fire damage case, the carrier will be exempt from liability.117
The terms control and connection form the conceptual under-
pinnings of "design or neglect" and "actual fault or privity." The
control issue reduces to a question of chronology: did the negli-
gence leading to the fire occur before the voyage began?""8 The
facts relating to this question are typically indistinguishable from
those going to the proof of negligence itself.1"9 The connection is-
sue, on the other hand, involves identification of the individuals
responsible-or who should have been responsible-for the negli-
gence, which may be wholly unrelated to the facts showing the un-
derlying negligence itself.
Analyzing the fire exemption in terms of control and connec-
tion presents a way to flesh out its relationship to the carrier's
(crew too small and inadequately trained); The Sandgate Castle, 30 F. Supp. 344, 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1939) (inadequately repaired ship); The Doris Kellogg, 18 F. Supp. 159, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 1937) (carrier allowed a fire hazard to exist on ship), aff'd mem., 94 F.2d 1015 (2d
Cir. 1938); The Elizabeth Dantzler, 263 F. 596, 597 (E.D. Va. 1920) (fire occurred while ship
was in port).
"' See Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480
F.2d 669, 670-72 (2d Cir. 1973) (carrier did not correct inadequately designed fire-fighting
system); In re Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1953) (carrier's agent supervised
negligent stowage of dangerous cargo); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661,
663-64 (2d Cir.) (carrier's agent did not take proper measures to control fire), cert. de-
nied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947); United States v. Charbonnier, 45 F.2d 174, 176-77 (4th Cir. 1930)
(carrier hired incompetent officer); Gesellschaft Fur Getreidehandel A.G. v. S.S. Texas, 318
F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. La. 1970) (carrier's agent allowed ship to leave port smoking).
'1 See Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 425-28
(1932) (although negligence occurred while the vessel was under carrier's control, the negli-
gent act was done by a person whose conduct could not be imputed to the carrier).
128 A provocative question is raised by the situation where the carrier is in communica-
tion with the vessel while at sea. See, e.g., The Cleveco, 154 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1946). Given
the tremendous effective authority of the master while the vessel is at sea, the traditional
doctrine ending the period of the carrier's control at the point the vessel is underway would
appear to be a sensible rule. But see G. GiLMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 894 (arguing
that technological developments have "destroyed the factual assumption on which the older
case law rested").
119 For a shipper to prove that a fire was caused by improper stowage, for example,
would necessarily require proof that the negligence occurred while the vessel was under the
carrier's control since cargo is stowed before the voyage begins. See Isbrandtsen v. United
States, 201 F.2d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1953). Similarly, proof that a fire was caused by an im-
properly trained crew member would necessarily coincide with a showing that the negli-
gence-not properly manning the ship-occurred while the vessel was under the carrier's
control. See Cerro Sales Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enters., 403 F. Supp. 562, 567 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
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statutory duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy ves-
sel.120 The issue of control focuses attention on the period of time
prior to the start of the voyage, as does the requirement of provid-
ing a seaworthy vessel. The connection issue focuses attention on
the carrier's personal obligations, as does the duty to exercise due
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. The correspondence helps
explain the coincidence of shipper recovery for fire damage and
facts showing unseaworthiness. 121 If negligence leading to a fire oc-
curred while- the vessel was in the carrier's control before the start
of the voyage and the negligence was connected to the carrier per-
sonally, the requirements for actual fault or privity and failure to
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel are both
satisfied.
Despite the coincidence, there is not a perfect identity be-
tween the carrier's duty to exercise due diligence to provide a sea-
worthy vessel and the fire exemption's standard of actual fault or
privity or design or neglect. The fire exemption can be overcome
only if the carrier's high managerial agents are directly connected
to the negligence that resulted in fire damage. 22 The carrier's duty
to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship is nondelega-
ble; any failure to fulfill this duty can be imputed to the carrier,
regardless of personal connection. 2 Although any negligence that
is directly connected to the carrier would suffice to prove want of
due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship, not all acts or omissions
attributable to the carrier under the seaworthiness requirement
would satisfy the fire exemption's personal connection require-
ment. A fire exemption burden allocation may be shaped around
this disparity that integrates the exemption with the carrier's stat-
utory burden to prove due diligence.
B. Allocation of the Connection Issue
Once the requirement of actual fault or privity, or design or
neglect, is broken into its component parts of control and connec-
tion, it becomes clear that it is the allocation of the connection
issue that brings the traditional allocation in fire cases into conflict
with the COGSA seaworthiness provision. If the burden falls to the
shipper to prove carrier connection to the negligence that led to
the fire damage, then the carrier will have escaped the statutory
"o See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5, 113-14, 116 and accompanying text.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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burden of proving the exercise of due diligence to provide a sea-
worthy vessel. If, however, the burden shifted to the carrier to
prove the exercise of due diligence once the shipper proved the ex-
istence of negligence leading to the fire damage while the vessel
was in the carrier's control, the personal aspect of the fire exemp-
tion would be effectively eliminated. The solution, suggested by
the decision in Hasbro Industries,24 is to split the difference.
Both the seaworthiness requirement and the personal aspect
of the fire exemption can be preserved if the burden is placed on
the carrier to prove the exercise of due diligence only with regard
to those persons whose conduct has traditionally been imputed to
the carrier in fire damage and limitation cases: directors, managing
agents, shoreside supervisors, and the like.' 25 The carrier would not
have to prove the vessel was seaworthy in all respects, 26 nor would
it have to prove the exercise of due diligence by all personnel in its
employ.12 7 The carrier would have the burden of proving the ab-
sence of a direct connection between the unseaworthiness that
caused the fire damage and the carrier's high-level personnel. By
limiting the reach of the due diligence requirement in this way, the
statutory burden allocation is preserved without vitiating the per-
sonal aspect of the fire exemption. The tension between the fire
exemption and the seaworthiness requirement is resolved without
shunting either provision to an inferior position.
C. Other Legal and Economic Consequences of Allocating the
Connection Issue to the Carrier
1. Connection and the Limitation Act. Placing the connec-
tion burden on the carrier in fire damage cases would bring the fire
statute into harmony with the Supreme Court's burden of proof
allocation for section 3 of the Limitation Act, covering nonfire
damage actions.1 28 This allocation also would follow the trend in
" See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
125 See The Pocone, 1946 Am. Mar. Cas. 821, 830-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947). See also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
12' Thus the doctrine of The Isis, effectively repudiated by Congress with the passage
of COGSA, see supra note 44, would not be revived. The unseaworthiness present would
have to be the proximate cause of the fire or its damage. See The Sandgate Castle, 30 F.
Supp. 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
127 This allocation would thus not be contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Earle
& Stoddart, Inc. v. Eflerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420 (1932). The chief engineer (a
ship's officer) was negligent in that case, id. at 424; his conduct would not be connected to
the carrier under the proposed rule.
128 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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modern admiralty cases to interpret the Limitation Act strictly.129
The Limitation Act is viewed today as a nineteenth-century anach-
ronism and courts have been more willing to deny limitation than
were their predecessors of the last century. is °
2. The British Rule. British precedents are well respected in
American admiralty courts, largely due to our joint common law
traditions.131 The British statutory scheme is similar to that of the
United States, with the language of the respective COGSA fire ex-
emptions being identical.232 The British have for many years allo-
cated the burden on the connection issue to the carrier.1 33 A simi-
lar allocation under United States law would bring two important
and closely related admiralty jurisdictions into conformity on this
issue.
3. Cost Effects of Allocating the Connection Burden to the
Carrier. The effects of a particular burden allocation rule on mari-
time commerce are necessarily uncertain and speculative. Carriers
faced with a greater burden of proof before receiving exoneration
from liability might take greater precautions resulting in a de-
crease in the number of fires on board vessels. This consideration
is somewhat undercut by the interest the carrier already has in the
prevention of fire: the preservation of the vessel.134 Allocation of
"I See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1982); In
re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d 1013, 1015 (2d Cir. 1969).
130 See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437-38 (1954) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (4-1-4 decision); see also Donovan, supra note 19, at 1035-37; Springer, Amend-
ments to the Federal Law Limiting the Liability of Shipowners, 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 14,
38-39 (1936); Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other Than Harter and COGSA) of Carrier's
Liability to Cargo-Limitation of Liability and the Fire Statute, 45 TuL. L. REv. 959, 987
(1971); Comment, The Maritime Law Association's Proposed Statute on Shipowners' Limi-
tation of Liability: A Practical Alternative to the IMCO Convention, 10 LAw AM. 839, 844-
45 (1978); Comment, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old Doc-
trine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 389 (1964).
131 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 59 (1950); May v.
Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt A.G., 290 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1933) (The Isis); Knott v.
Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69, 74 (1900); Horn v. Cia de Navegacion Fruco, S.A., 404 F.2d 422,
434 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); The Hermosa, 57 F.2d 20, 24-
25 (9th Cir. 1932).
M Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, ch. 22, art. PV(2)(b).
"' The English rule on the connection issue is that the carrier must disprove "actual
fault or privity." Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 1915 A.C. 705, 715-16
(H.L. 1915); see also Northern Fishing Co. v. Eddom, [1960] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 1, 11 (H.L.
1960); Patterson S.S., Ltd. v. Robin Hood Mills, Ltd., [1937] 58 Lloyd's List L.R. 33, 39
(P.C. 1937); Corporation of the Royal Exch. Assurance v. Kingsley Nav. Co., 1923 A.C. 235,
244-45 (P.C. 1923); T. CARVER, supra note 11, at 213; W. TETLnEY, supra note 28, at 185.
'" See Hellawell, supra note 59, at 365 n.20; see generally R. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW 78-79 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the allocation of insurance risks in performance
of contracts frustrated by fire).
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the connection issue to the carrier might also affect freight rates,
most likely causing them to go up.1s5
The setting of freight rates is in part determined by the price
the carrier has to pay for protection and indemnity insurance. 136
Allocation of the connection issue to the carrier might lead to an
increase in the carrier's insurance costs. Shippers also normally
carry insurance on their cargo. By allowing a possibility of easier
recovery against the carrier, the allocation of the connection issue
to the carrier might cause a downward adjustment of cargo insur-
ance rates.1 37 Shifting the burden of proof allocation between par-
ties will not necessarily shift the costs exactly between carrier and
shipper. Carrier and cargo insurance are typically underwritten at
different places and may respond to market pressures
differently.""8
The role of the burden of proof rules in encouraging settle-
ment and decreasing the costs of litigation should also be taken
into consideration. Allocating the connection issue to the carrier
might encourage carriers to settle in more cases, thereby reducing
litigation costs. Conversely, allocating the connection issue to the
shipper might prevent the prosecution of damage suits where the
evidence was doubtful or nonexistent. In any event, establishment
of a clear rule one way or the other would eliminate some costs
involved in pursuing uncertain claims or defenses. 3 '
Finally, it must be remembered that the Limitation Act and
later congressional enactments were intended in part to advance
the interests of United States carriers and to encourage capital in-
13' Many large international carriers are members of shipping conferences that set the
rates for particular shipping routes. The participation of U.S. carriers in the conferences is
exempt from antitrust laws. See 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976); see also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 3, at 990-95. The exact effect of a burden of proof rule on those freight rates is
difficult to ascertain. See Approaches to Basic Policy Decisions Concerning Allocation of
Risks Between the Cargo Owner and Carrier, supra note 113, at 295.
M Most carriers are insured through protection and indemnity ("P&I") clubs, mutual
associations that insure against the carrier's liability for, among other risks, cargo damage.
The dominant clubs are in Europe. See Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and
Marine Insurance Practice, 12 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 299, 311 (1981).
1'7 The cargo underwriting business has been characterized as highly competitive, a sit-
uation that could lead to lower premiums if the cargo underwriters have a greater ability to
obtain payment for damages from the P&I clubs. See Selvig, supra note 136, at 316.
'33 Unlike the carrier's P&I coverage, cargo insurance is normally underwritten in the
place of the origin of the goods. Thus marine insurance underwriting should be analyzed
from the perspective that there are two different markets involved. See Selvig, supra note
136, at 311.
131 See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An




vestment in shipping.140 The traditional allocation rule might influ-
ence shippers to avoid shipping cargo on United States vessels.
Conversely, allocating the connection issue to the carrier might en-
courage shippers to enter shipping contracts with United States
carriers. Notwithstanding the traditional congressional interest in
the American maritime industry, the United States is now more of
a shipper than a carrier nation.141 The proposed allocation of the
connection issue to the carrier is thus a better reflection of the cur-
rent commercial status of United States shipping interests.
CONCLUSION
The fire statute and the COGSA fire exemption represent a
unique benefit to the carrier. The traditional burden allocation re-
quires the shipper to prove the connection of the carrier to the
negligence involved in the fire. This rule is inconsistent with the
burden allocation for nonfire Limitation Act cases and with the ex-
plicit statutory burden in COGSA requiring the carrier to show its
exercise of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. This com-
ment recommends placing the burden on the shipper to prove the
negligence involved in the fire and requiring the carrier to prove
the absence of connection to that negligence. This rule would inte-
grate the interpretation of all the statutes involved in fire damage
litigation and tend to produce a more even balance in the alloca-
tion of the risks in a maritime venture.
James H. Hohenstein
140 See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 332, 715 (1851); see also Norwich Co. v.
Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 121 (1872); G. GIMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 818-19.
The federal government is still very committed to assisting the shipping industry. See, e.g.,
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-469, 84 Stat. 1018 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 15, 33, 40 & 46 U.S.C. (1976)); Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha
Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1943); Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
104, 121 (1871); Automobile Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 224 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); see generally G. GmMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, at 963-82
(discussing the history of government activities designed to promote the welfare of the ship-
ping industry).
14 See Note, supra note 59, at 440.
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